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Abstract
As nuclear power has evolved from the mid-twentieth century to today, it has
experienced phases of rapid growth, regulation, and distrust concerning operations and waste
disposal. This study will analyze the policy community active in these changes as they have
progressed through the policymaking process and will examine the actors within an “iron
triangle” framework to evaluate the community’s relationships, power structure, and
effectiveness. Specifically, this thesis seeks to answer two research questions: 1) how does
interest group behavior influence nuclear policy communities, and 2) does the iron triangle
framework explain the nuclear policy community relationships and outcomes. While historical
and background information on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) will provide the
overall national context, the research is designed as a case study, and as such, will primarily
investigate the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant in South Haven, Michigan.
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I. Introduction
An intriguing, complex, and unresolved plot marks the tale of nuclear power.
Throughout its brief existence in mainstream society, nuclear science has been met with
responses running the gamut from worldwide revere to intense incredulity. Likewise, the
promises and perils of nuclear energy have evidenced themselves in gripping ways, from
unprecedented operational efficiency to the 1986 Chernobyl accident. The immense power
contained within nuclear energy is therefore much more than merely chemical; its metaphorical
energy has spread into social, political, and environmental fields with vigor over the last five
decades. In short, nuclear energy has and continues to be a worldwide phenomenon unlike any
other the world has seen.
Due to its far-reaching impact, the specifics of managing nuclear energy bear much
inquiry. Analysis of nuclear power’s policy domain is crucial in order to understand where the
industry is headed and who is making the decisions. By investigating the relationships and
structure of the communities in charge of operating nuclear plants, many questions about the
origins of nuclear power, as well as its status today, can be answered.
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II. History and Overview of Nuclear Power
By most accounts, the dawn of the “atomic age” was ushered in by the bombings of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II in 1945 (Walker and Wellock, 2010). The raw,
extreme power contained in this new technology captured the attention and imagination of
scientists, leaders, and citizens around the world. Shortly after the bombings, physicists and
politicians pursued the use of nuclear power for peaceful, civilian use. Passage of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1946 created a “virtual Government monopoly” in this domain and allowed the
federal government to have exclusive rights over usage and application of nuclear energy
(Walker and Wellock, 2010). As part of the 1946 Act, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC) was created to oversee all aspects of nuclear development and use. Within less than a
decade, the Atomic Energy Act was amended in 1954 to change the AEC’s mission and goals
from a nuclear technology gatekeeper to the technology’s promoter. A detailed discussion of
nuclear energy’s past is required in order to understand its rise in popularity during the midtwentieth century and its sustained use today.
Political and scientific forces combined in the mid-1950’s to accelerate the pace of
nuclear proliferation and expansion. The push for peaceful nuclear development during this time
was twofold: 1) there was an “impulse to show that atomic technology could serve both
constructive and destructive purposes,” and 2) there was a general, strong desire to outpace the
USSR and other countries in the successful implementation of nuclear technologies (Walker and
Wellock, 2010, pg. 3). As part of its duties under the 1954 Amendments, the AEC was to “1)
continue its weapons program, 2) promote the commercial uses of nuclear power, and 3) protect
against the hazards of those peaceful applications.” The AEC’s preferred strategy for
development placed a heavy emphasis on a “partnership” between the Government and private
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companies; this arrangement was thought to increase the efficiency, soundness, and feasibility of
the nuclear industry. However, the dual role of the AEC to both promote and regulate the
industry eventually became a major difficulty for the organization and “damaged” the credibility
of its regulatory and safety programs (Walker and Wellock, 2010, pg. 4). Indeed, as has been
noted in the political science community, “a kind of goal displacement occurred,” wherein the
easier goal of promotion typically overpowered the more “problematic” goal of regulation
(Temples, 1980, pg. 242). At a time when nuclear science was just in its infancy, the intrigue
and excitement around this new technology, much of which was promulgated by the
government, lead to its popularity among energy providers.
In general, nuclear regulatory guidelines set by the AEC in the early years were charged
with ensuring public safety without being overly burdensome to the point of inhibiting nuclear
growth. For example, specifically relating to the latter directive, AEC construction permits did
not even require finalized technical data on the safety of a facility before issuance of a permit;
this allowed for companies to pursue their projects without a burdensome delay (Walker and
Wellock, 2010). AEC’s continued championing of the nuclear industry throughout the 1950’s
and 1960’s eventually caused the Commission to fall under heavy criticism for its regulatory
strategies from other sectors of the government, including its Congressional oversight
committee, the former Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE). In one instance, after
reviewing plans for a new type of reactor proposed by the Power Reactor Development
Company (PRDC) in 1956, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), a separate
commission also created in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, found that “there is insufficient
information available at this time to give assurance that the PRDC reactor can be operated at this
site without public hazard” (Walker and Wellock, 2010, pp. 11-12). Despite this assertion, the
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AEC granted the PRDC plant a construction permit based on the fact that uncertainties could still
be addressed during the construction phase and that it would be detrimental to delay the
introduction of a new technology to the nuclear market. The JCAE’s response to the
Commission’s decision was resoundingly negative and further eroded the AEC’s image as a
reliable nuclear regulator (Walker and Wellock, 2010).
Beginning in the late 1960’s, nuclear technology improved rapidly, allowing for plants to
produce more power, but simultaneously resulted in more complex plant designs. Environmental
concerns in the 1960’s, including air quality, added to the attractiveness of nuclear power, and by
1967, nearly half of all power plants ordered by utilities were nuclear, totaling 31 units in that
year alone (Walker and Wellock, 2010). The combination of increased design complexity and
overall plant popularity placed a strain on the AEC’s ability to license and manage plants across
the country. Even though the Commission’s staff increased by 50 percent between 1965 and
1970, its licensing and inspection caseload increased by 600 percent during this same time frame.
As a direct result, application review times jumped from an average of 1 year in 1965 to over 18
months in 1970, sparking criticism from the industry (Walker and Wellock, 2010, pp. 28-29).
The general trend for the nuclear industry continuing on into the 1970’s was increasing
complexity both in political and environmental soundness. One of the newest issues to be faced
by the agency was the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in December
1969. Section 102(2)(c) of NEPA “requires all federal agencies to prepare an environmental
impact statement (EIS) on major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
environment” (Percival, Schroeder, Miller, & Leape, 2009, pg. 858). As it related to the AEC,
NEPA mandated the agency to evaluate nuclear operation permits not only based on possible
radiological effects, but also based upon any and all environmental effects. The agency
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complied with this new mandate, but looked to environmental reports prepared by state and other
federal agencies, thereby working around a need to conduct any investigations themselves.
Environmentalists, Congress, and the courts met this decision with harsh criticism; the AEC’s
limited interpretation of NEPA was rejected in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals case Calvert
Cliffs Coordinating Committee vs. Atomic Energy Commission (1971). Put plainly, the court
declared, “[we] believe that the Commission’s crabbed interpretation of NEPA makes a mockery
of the Act” (Percival et al., 2009, pg. 862). Furthermore, the court reminded AEC that §102
requires compliance “to the fullest extent possible,” and does “not provide an escape hatch for
foot-dragging agencies” (Percival et al., 2009, pg. 861). With yet another ruling against its
favor, the AEC continued to lose public and political support in an era of increasing
environmental concern and demand for energy.
Soon after passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, an idea was proposed to separate
regulatory and promotional functions between two agencies, but “this possibility […] seemed
premature and unwarranted” at the time (Walker and Wellock, 2010, pg. 47). Only after years of
proven difficulty in housing both functions within one organization was the decision made to
dissolve the AEC and formally charge two separate government entities with regulation and
promotion. Congress passed the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, which officially created
the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the U.S. Energy Research and
Development Administration (ERDA), placing each in charge of regulation and promotion,
respectively (Walker and Wellock, 2010, pg. 49). As the energy crisis peaked towards the mid1970’s, efficacy in nuclear power still existed, but overall public support was waning (Walker
and Wellock, 2010). Even with a new agency at the helm, the image of nuclear energy had
already been tarnished enough to consistently be met with incredulity.
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Despite lingering concerns about the ability of agencies to regulate nuclear power
properly, the end of the 1970’s witnessed an expansion of agency deference. Calvert Cliffs
ushered in an era of strict readings on NEPA, thus limiting the ability of the AEC to choose how
the Act would be implemented or followed; in contrast, the Supreme Court Case Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC (1978) reinstated some agency discretion in NEPA
implementation. The language of NEPA is clear in that agencies must gather information about
environmental impacts and alternatives. Of course, what constitutes an “impact” and how many
“alternatives” are acceptable have been debated. In the Vermont case, the Supreme Court ruled
that deference should be given to the agency in question when it comes to how many alternatives
must be proposed. Justice Rehnquist stated that an EIS cannot be “found wanting simply
because the agency failed to include every alternative device and thought conceivable by the
mind of man (Percival et al., 2009, pg. 913). Furthermore, in the same case, the Court explicitly
stated that NEPA’s “mandate to the agencies is essentially procedural” (Percival et al., 2009, pg.
915). The latter part of the 1970’s represented a departure from agency doubt in adequately
interpreting statutory mandates, thereby giving the NRC more freedom and agency autonomy.
In a stunning series of events, and after only four years in operation, the newly created
NRC was soon tasked with handling the most disastrous nuclear accident in United States history
to date- the Three Mile Island (TMI) incident on March 28, 1979 (Walker and Wellock, 2010).
Located near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, the TMI Nuclear Station suffered a partial core
meltdown after a pressure relief valve was stuck open, allowing for large amounts of core
coolant to escape. Through a series of human and mechanical errors, the problem was not
detected until irreparable damage had been done, forcing an emergency shutdown and flooding
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of the core (Walker and Wellock, 2010). In the days following the accident, uncoordinated
response efforts, confusion about the cause, and conflicting safety reports from the Government
and experts fostered a “deepening perception of a technology that was out of control” (Walker
and Wellock, 2010, pg. 54). TMI provided evidence that disastrous consequences could result
from “unanticipated” events, even minor system failures compounded by simple lack of adequate
response. Luckily for TMI, the vast majority of radioactivity was contained in the reactor, and
studies have revealed that no increases of cancer in the area have been linked to the 1979
incident (Walker and Wellock, 2010, pg. 56). Although the plant did not have substantial
radioactive fallout, it is undeniable that fallout of the political and social variety followed TMI.
Because of the accident, NRC officials decided to “reexamine” their safety requirements and
revise them accordingly. More stringent construction, operation, and inspections protocols were
enforced, and a specific focus on addressing “human factors” was pressed (Walker and Wellock,
2010, pg. 57). Nationwide support of nuclear power remained high even after TMI, with sixtythree percent of respondents in a national survey believing that “nuclear power [is] important to
the nation’s energy future.” Despite this strong figure, sixty-three percent of respondents in the
same survey also disapproved of the construction of a new power plant near their own
communities (Temples, 1980, pg. 254).
Less than a decade after the TMI accident, the worst nuclear disaster in history occurred
at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in the former USSR on April 26, 1986. During a test of
Unit 4 at the plant, an uncontrolled reaction precipitated a violent explosion that significantly
damaged the containment structure, allowing “massive” amounts of radiation to be released from
the plant (Walker and Wellock, 2010, pg. 58). Although the disaster was in no way related to
U.S. nuclear operations or design, the net effect was damaging to domestic perceptions of the

7

safety of nuclear power. At the time of Chernobyl in 1986, it had already been eight years since
the most recent nuclear plant had been ordered by utilities, and cancellations for planned units
were on the rise. The NRC granted full-power permits to over forty reactors throughout the
1980’s, many of which had been licensed to begin construction in the mid-1970’s (Walker and
Wellock, 2010, pp. 59-60). Despite the continued attractiveness of the nuclear option in relation
to “dirtier” alternatives like coal, there were still looming questions about evacuation and
emergency strategies that required further attention by the NRC.
Moving out of the 1980’s, the NRC found itself needing to address new concerns with its
maturing industry, including protocols relating to the decommissioning and relicensing of
reactors. From 1947 to 1975, a total of fifty reactors were decommissioned, however the
standards for decommissioning those plants were antiquated by the end of the 1980’s and early
1990’s. The NRC released new rules regarding decommissioning procedures, as well as
revisions to its relicensing scheme (Walker and Wellock, 2010). After deliberation, the NRC
reduced the length of a license from forty years to twenty years in order to more reliably
guarantee aging plants’ safety. The 1990’s also ushered in an era of “performance-based”
regulations that were designed to maintain safety, but also reduce the costs of heavily
proscriptive regulatory mandates. The concept behind “performance-based” regulations was that
the NRC would set a goal to attain, but allow each licensee to determine how to reach that goal,
as opposed to the agency dictating or drawing up explicit guidelines. Many top NRC officials
praised this regulatory approach. (Walker and Wellock, 2010, pg. 69). In addition, the agency
bolstered its efforts to improve overall quality assurance and consistent plant maintenance,
especially in the aftermath of TMI. This was accomplished through the inclusion of two
permanent resident inspectors for each reactor in the country, as well as “performance-based”
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inspections which included “direct observation of plant activities […] instead of document
reviews that simply demonstrated that a licensee conformed to regulations and procedures”
(Walker and Wellock, 2010, pp. 75-76). Overall, the performance standards for plants have
become increasingly effective; comparing reactor “up time” (power production) from the 1970’s
to today, the current figure is around 90 percent, as opposed to 50-60 percent average “up time”
in the 1970’s (Walker and Wellock, 2010, pg. 94).
Within the past 15 years, the nuclear industry has faced even more issues stemming from
end-of-fuel-cycle concerns as well as safety questions raised after September 11, 2001. As part
of a national nuclear waste strategy, Congress passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982
(NWPA), with the ultimate goal of researching, selecting, and operating nuclear waste
repositories for the nation by January of 1998; however, in 1987, an amendment to NWPA
singled out Yucca Mountain in Nevada as the sole repository for nuclear waste. The NWPA
Amendment became widely known as the “screw Nevada bill” and was seen as a “legislative
atrocity” by many because of its hasty implementation (Weeks, 2011, pg. 86). For decades
afterwards, Nevada officials executed political maneuvers to stave off the impending opening of
a repository, including passing state laws banning the disposal of nuclear waste within state
borders by any agency (Weeks, 2011). Due to insurmountable political and environmental
problems, DOE was not able to meet its 1998 deadline. In 2010, the Obama administration
directed the DOE to withdraw its application to the NRC for the Yucca repository, effectively
killing the program.
In an attempt to create a fix for the nuclear waste problem, President Obama chartered the
Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future (BRC) in 2010. After investigating past
failures and present options, the BRC made recommendations for successful waste solutions
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going forward. Firstly, the BRC found that the United States must “commit to a new, more
flexible and more adaptive approach to siting and developing” future repositories (BRC, 2012,
pg. 73). This approach helps to prevent run-away site-specific projects that might lead to
partiality. Furthermore, the BRC recommended that as part of an adaptive process, flexibility be
well emphasized. BRC defines flexibility as the ability of project managers to be “able and
willing to reevaluate earlier decisions and redesign or change course when new information
warrants” (BRC, 2012, pg. 76). As opposed to proscriptive, hard-and-fast deadlines, the flexible
nature of “milestones” is preferred by the BRC, as an adaptive staging process can allow for
“potential problems to be corrected” early on before they become burdensome to fix (BRC,
2012, pg. 76). In all, the adaptive approach is “more conducive to building and maintaining
public support” for long-term projects like a repository (BRC, 2012, pg. 74). In the meantime,
however, the safety of this storage method is still debated today, and a nationwide SNF storage
plan has yet to materialize at the time of this writing.
In addition to the question of SNF storage, the events of September 11, 2001 have also
raised concern over the safety of plants and nuclear fuel from terrorist attacks. After a prolonged
discussion between the NRC other interested parties, the NRC argued that current plant safety
and on-site SNF storage was adequate to protect the public health, although groups such as the
National Academy of Sciences determined that a calculated attack could result in a successful
compromise of the safety of nuclear fuel (Walker and Wellock, 2010, pg. 88).
A twenty-three percent increase in demand for energy during the 1990’s and its continual
rise speak to the need for greater energy production today (Walker and Wellock, 2010, pg. 94).
Currently, 104 active nuclear reactors are responsible for 20 percent of the United States’
electricity supply (Wall, 2007). With virtually no greenhouse gas emissions and the prospect of
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a 3,500-year supply of uranium, the benefits of nuclear energy still speak for themselves –
especially during a time in which public concerns about global warming and limited energy
sources reach new heights (Kessides, 2010). As recent as 2009, the NRC had received 18
operating license applications for 28 new nuclear plants, however only a handful planned to
begin construction soon after license approval (Walker and Wellock, 2010, pg. 96). Due to
problems past and present, coupled with the U.S. economy’s state of uncertainty and the
exceedingly high start-up costs for nuclear plants, it remains to be seen whether or not a “nuclear
renaissance” is on the horizon. Although regulators have improved their record over the last few
decades, regulatory distrust still lingers for many, leaving the future of nuclear power in a state
of flux.
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III. Framework
Policy Communities
A crucial component to understanding policymaking is the concept of a policy
community, broadly defined as a set of actors, both official policymakers and nongovernmental
actors, involved in creating policy within a particular policy domain (Birkland, 2011). These
communities substantially impact the direction of a policy issue throughout the policymaking
process and can be populated by a variety of actors, including Congress people, federal agencies,
experts in the policy domain, and public interest groups (Birkland, 2011). Based on the popular
desire for political equality and representation in the policymaking process, it is prudent to focus
study on which groups participate in the process, as well as which groups have an impact on the
policy outcomes (Golden, 1998). Some communities are structured in a closed, isolated manner,
allowing only certain actors into the actual policymaking process; these communities are
commonly referred to as “iron triangles.” In contrast, other policy communities are fluid,
accessible, and populated by a large number of actors; political scientist Hugh Heclo labels
communities matching these criteria as “issue networks” (Golden, 1998). Although these
community structures represent both extremes of the spectrum, iron triangles and issue networks
can be used as anchors to help illustrate community-defining features such as actor composition,
inclusivity, and rigidity. An analysis of these two community structures will follow, organized
by the aforementioned characteristics.
Actor composition, that is, the types of actors within the policy community, is one of the
key characteristics that differentiate an iron triangle from an issue network. Evaluating this
composition reveals which parties are responsible for decision-making within a policy domain,
as well as whose interests are at stake. The participants within an iron triangle are limited in
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number and are all usually connected with an executive agency. Beginning in the 1960’s,
Congress delegated increasing amounts of its lawmaking powers to administrative agencies,
allowing those agencies to create rules that carry the same weight as legislation (Golden, 1998).
In this scheme, Congress “instructs an administrative agency to implement the statute by
resolving all the remaining issues,” thereby giving agencies “considerable discretion over […]
the substance of regulatory policy” (Percival, Schroeder, Miller, and Leape, 2009, pg. 159). The
overall power of iron triangle policymaking therefore lies between 1) an executive agency, 2) the
agency’s clientele group (interest groups),
and 3) the agency’s Congressional

Figure 1. The Iron Triangle

oversight committee (Temples, 1980).
Taken together, these three groups of
individuals make up the three “sides,” or
sectors, of the iron triangle actor
composition. Although the agencies are
an unelected branch, a “democratic
safeguard” in the form of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 1946 allows for a public notice and comment period,
permitting citizens to directly weigh in on policy decisions (Golden, 1998, pg. 246). As part of
the Act, agency decisions are also subject to judicial review; section 706 of the APA specifies
the standard for agency review as “arbitrary and capricious” interpretation (Percival et al., 2009,
pg. 175). Besides APA provisions, however, there are few avenues for expressing public
interest, and recent research still questions whether or not APA recourse provides an adequate
check on bureaucracy power (Golden, 1998).
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As opposed to the relatively small, bounded set of actors found in an iron triangle, issue
networks are characterized by a “large number of participants” (Golden, 1998, pg. 249).
Additional members to an issue network might include the media, competing lobbies, and more
congressional committees. Overall, these communities include the same kinds actors found in an
iron triangle, but also feature an increased variety of groups per sector, and more individual
actors per group. For example, whereas iron triangle Congressional input is limited to key
committee members, issue networks involve members from all parts of Congress, thereby decentralizing the power and interests of this sector of the community (Birkland, 2011, pg. 157).
Furthermore, issue networks incorporate a greater variety of interest groups, which in turn
diffuses power from any one particular group or idea. The actor composition of issue networks
expands on the limited number of participants present in the iron triangle model.
In addition to the basic composition of participants in the policy community, another
delineating attribute is the community’s inclusivity, that is, its accessibility and receptivity to
various actors inside and outside the community. Equal representation of public interests relies
in part upon the receptiveness of a policy community to different ideas from various groups. In
the case of an iron triangle, the most extreme form of this community engages in “behind the
scenes” decisions that pursue mutually beneficial solutions for all involved (Temples, 1980, pg.
240). Congressional committees, an executive agency, and the agency’s clientele “enjoy lowvisibility cordial relations and produce policy that favors all parties involved” (Golden, 1998, pg.
249). These communities are also distinctly characterized by a great degree of consensus
between the actors (Golden, 1998). Combining this policymaking strategy with a small group of
familiar actors, it is clear that room for additional or contradictory viewpoints is limited, thereby
reducing the level of accessibility to outside members of the policy community (Birkland, 2011,
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pg. 156). For example, before the enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act,
environmentalists would have found it difficult to demand the Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC) to investigate harmful environmental effects of power plants, as the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy, the AEC, and plant operators were not focused on the issue, however these were
the only actors directing policy in this area at the time. The tight negotiation within this small
network of actors fosters comfortable relationships and has even been labeled a “policy
monopoly” (Birkland, 2011, pg. 156).
Unlike the closed nature of iron triangles, high levels of inclusivity, “accessibility,” and
“competition” characterize issue networks (Golden, 1998, pg. 249). The broad actor
composition of issue networks lends itself to greater receptivity, as pre-figured patterns of
policymaking based on established relationships do not form as readily in issue networks as they
do in iron triangles. Thus, groups looking to join the community or offer different opinions will
have a better chance of doing so. Whereas iron triangle actors become increasingly concerned
with material interests for themselves, the base concern for issue networks is a common problem
that all actors want to address. Heclo argues that issue networks can be thought of as “shared
knowledge groups that tie together large numbers of participants with common technical
expertise.” This leads to the “mark” of issue networks, “conflict and competition” (as cited in
Golden, 1998, pg. 249). Conflict is in fact indicative of an inclusive policy community, as an
increasing number of actors in one community usually results in differing opinions and actors are
more likely to pursue compromises in order to formulate policy acceptable to all members of the
community. Looking at iron triangles in comparison, the opposite is also true: overwhelming
consensus within the community reveals a lack of inclusivity, in part because the actors in the
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community are strong enough to enact favorable legislation without the support of many other
groups.
Finally, a third crucial distinction between iron triangles and issue networks is the level
of rigidity displayed by the policy communities. Rigidity gets at the flexibility of the
organization over time, and can serve as a complementary indicator to inclusivity revealing how
a community reacts to new ideas or differing viewpoints. As rigidity increases, the potential for
impact from one sector of the community decreases. Iron triangles are known for remaining
relatively “stable” over time, in part due to their mutually beneficial relationships (Temples,
1980, pg. 240). Actors in iron triangles remain “consistent” and produce predictable policy
outcomes (Golden, 1998, pg. 249). Despite the fact that iron triangles are inflexible, rigidity can
sometimes be challenged through a phenomenon called the “issue-attention cycle” (Rourke,
1984, pg 51). The overall theory is based on the fact that different issues rise and fall in
importance on the public agenda. Peak political and social issues can emerge in a variety of
ways, but the general outcome is increased visibility of a specific policy domain and those
responsible for its direction within the policy community. Greater attention to a specific domain
is not always a positive thing, however. Newly-interested parties may be “extremely suspicious”
of a community’s decision-making (usually the agency’s current operating strategies), causing it
to fall under heavy scrutiny (Rourke, 1984, pg. 52). Over time, pressure from external groups
may even cause the agency to change its direction.
In direct contrast to iron triangles, issue networks feature “fluid” membership and
unpredictable policy outcomes. Because of issue networks’ greater accessibility, the overall
potential for citizen and group participation is higher than in iron triangles. Issue networks exist
to solve problems, and as policy makes its way through the process, actors will enter and exit the
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community arena as necessary (Golden, 1998). This open-door scheme makes for unpredictable
policy outcomes, as countless groups may affect one piece of policy. Once again, because the
goal of an issue network is to fix an issue, a new group of knowledgeable actors is struck up each
time another issue emerges, promoting issue-individualized policy-making.

Interest Groups
Within the policymaking process, interest groups only have a finite amount of space for
substantive impact on policy decisions. Starting at the “agenda setting” stage of the process,
interest groups work to get their concerns within the purview of governmental actors, also known
as the “institutional agenda” (Birkland, 2011, pg. 171). Means of access to this agenda are fairly
widespread, but a common requirement is that there must be a sizable advocacy group in order to
garner more attention. For this reason, smaller groups may consolidate into larger “peak
associations” capable of advocating for common beliefs. These peak associations increase the
visibility of organizations, as well as their financial stability.

In addition to the formation of larger peak associations, interest groups pursue other
strategies in an attempt to influence policy. One primary tactic is lobbying, which involves the
direct solicitation of legislative and/or executive official actors to enact policies favorable to a
group’s concerns (Birkland, 2011, pg. 139). This strategy usually requires an interest group of
considerable size in order persuade official actors to engage with the group. Still within the
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agenda setting phase of policymaking, groups may chose to reach out to media outlets in order to
garner public support or raise awareness of an issue. The theory here is that increased
information distribution will lead to mass public unrest, eventually forcing government
representatives to listen to a constituency.
The “alternative selection” phase of the policymaking process also gives public interest
groups the opportunity to substantially impact policy (Birkland, 2011). Once an issue is on the
agenda, interest groups (presumably sometimes the same groups that brought attention to the
issue) may propose specific solutions to members of government. Interest groups with enough
resources may even have hired experts in the field to formulate policy alternatives in line with
the interest group desires.
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IV. Methodology
While historical and background information on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) provide the overall national context, this research is designed as a case study, and as such,
primarily investigates the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant in South Haven, Michigan. Nuclear
power, specifically Palisades, garners much negative attention due to its safety concerns and the
waste disposal dilemma. Continued operation of Palisades in the face of recent mounting public
uncertainty leads to an ongoing erosion of trust in the plant, its operators, and other interested
parties involved with the plant; exploring the actors, permeability of the community, and means
of influence are crucial at this juncture in the policy domain. Thus, this study analyzes the policy
community active in policy changes through the policymaking process in recent history and also
examines the actors within existing policy community frameworks to evaluate the community’s
relationships, power structure, and inclusivity.
Specifically, this thesis seeks to answer two research questions: 1) how does interest
group behavior influence policy communities, and 2) how well does the iron triangle framework
explain the nuclear policy community relationships and outcomes. Methodologies for this study
include 1) historical documentation to provide a timeline of events and operations, 2) interviews
of members from various sectors of the nuclear policy community including interest groups,
agencies, and elected officials, and 3) participant observation. Combined, these sources of data
provide a comprehensive picture of Palisades’ policy community. The information gleaned from
these historical sources and primarily from the interviews will enhance citizens’, governments’,
and scholars’ understanding of the capacity of external groups to influence policy, as well as the
characteristics of Palisades’ community in context with existing frameworks.
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Historical Background
In October 2010, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission released an account of its own
history, as well as the history of nuclear energy at large in a publication entitled, “A Short
History of Nuclear Regulation, 1946-2009.” This source is frequently referenced in the
introductory sections of this study because of the document’s encompassing history that is
unmatched by few other documents discovered in online databases and elsewhere. Sources
found through Western Michigan University’s online databases contain largely insufficient data
to provide an accurate picture of nuclear history. Of the other sources found, many leave off
after the mid-1980’s, creating a clear gap in necessary historical data. By utilizing a source that
covers major events in nuclear history written from the national perspective, the study is able to
contextualize events at Palisades within a larger thematic backstory.
In addition to federal sources of historical information, I also consulted with sources local
to Palisades, as these sources are more likely to have detailed information regarding the plant’s
operation than a national-perspective source. The Kalamazoo Gazette is a major newspaper for
the Palisades community and has an online archive with articles covering the entire period of the
plant’s lifetime. Similar to the NRC’s self-published history, media outlets also generally report
on only the most important events, thus helping to narrow the scope of information down from
all potential historical records to only the most pertinent for study. Because of these merits, the
Gazette is the best option for culling information related to Palisades’ operations. The
newspaper’s indexes allow for a search of relevant stories relating to the history of Palisades by
using the keyword “Palisades.” This database contains 846 articles related to Palisades over the
1967 - 2013 time period. From the original search results, I began by reading the headlines
posted on each results page, starting with the oldest articles first and moving forward in time. If
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an article’s headline was about Palisades in relation to a sector of the policy community (ex. a
government agency, interest group, or elected official), I recorded the date of the article for
future research. In this manner, I further pared down the most important articles to those
specifically related to the research questions at hand dealing with actors in the policy
community. After making a list of approximately 80 articles, I read each article to further
determine its pertinence to the study. If the article provided substantive information relating to
Palisades’ operation and the policy community, I scanned, printed, and indexed the article
chronologically in a binder, ultimately numbering approximately 50 articles. Finally, I read and
qualitatively analyzed stories on events pertinent to the research questions to construct a timeline
with an emphasis on the relationships between and/or amongst the players.

Interviews
In addition to historical background information, another major source of data for this
study is one-on-one interviews with members of the policy community. The object of these
interviews is to assess the involvement and perceptions of a range of actors from the federal
government, state government, local government, agencies, energy industry, and interest groups
either responsible for or engaged in dealing with the policies and actions at Palisades. Data
collection for this section follows a strategy depicted by John W. Creswell in Qualitative Inquiry
and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Traditions, a “data collection circle.” Part of this
method involves “purposeful sampling” (Creswell, 1998). In recruiting subjects for this thesis,
the goal is to best represent the wide spectrum of participants involved with the continued
implementation of federal energy legislation, the NRC’s mandates, and Palisades’ operations.
Thus, the targeted categories for the study are 1) elected officials, 2) agency personnel, and 3)
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interest groups. These three categories comprise the major sectors of an iron triangle policy
community and therefore lend themselves to direct cross-examination between the literature and
Palisades. There is also a concerted effort to recruit those who hold leadership roles in each of
their respective categories, which excludes those holding positions within agencies and
organizations that play a minor role in the implementation of policy at Palisades or play a subtle
role in its development.
Following the creation of a contact list, the next step is gaining access and making
rapport (Creswell, 1998). Making initial contact and developing a relationship through
continued communication accomplishes this step. An email to potential interviewees serves as
the method for initial contact, in which a request was sent to participate in a phone interview. An
HSIRB consent form was also included in the initial e-mail in order to expedite the pre-interview
process. If a participant’s e-mail address was unobtainable prior to investigation, I contacted the
potential interviewee by phone first. A list of all 20 potential interviewees can be found in
Appendix A. The goal of the interview pool is to incorporate as many actors from various
sectors of the policy community; this is reflected in the number of potential interviewees per
category: Elected Officials- 7; Agency Personnel- 3; Interest Groups- 10. Redundancies within
each category improve the chances of connecting with at least one representative per category.
The approximate length of time that was expected of the interviewee, the nature of the study, our
contact information, and a brief summary of why we chose to contact them was all expressed in
this recruitment email/phone call.
After initial correspondence, I waited a week to hear back from the contacts, and I
utilized the interviews that I was able to obtain in the shortest amount of time. Of the
participants that were not available for an interview, I utilized any recommendations for
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additional interview participants that the subjects proffered. Had an individual expressed interest
in participating, a second email was sent to try and set up a phone interview time if it hadn’t
already been indicated in the response. There was also an attachment of the types of questions
that would be asked throughout the course of the phone interview. The perspectives gained from
interviews were ultimately contextualized with the other sources of data in this study (historical
record documentation and student participant-observer research).
In an attempt to gain an accurate picture of the policy community, multiple responses
from each sector (agency, government, and interest group) were sought. Respondents in each
sector number as follows: agency: 1, elected official: 1, interest group: 3. As previously
mentioned, multiple attempts to contact all members of the interview pool were made; only the
respondents that were able to respond within the interview portion of the study timeline were
ultimately interviewed. Four out of five interviews were conducted over the phone using an
Olympus DS-500 voice recorder, allowing me to capture the entire conversation for later
playback and transcription. All audio files were deleted upon the completion of the study in
order to protect the identity of interviewees. The fifth interview was in-person and unrecorded,
but a word processor was used to take notes. As part of the interview process, a non-statistical
analysis process was employed. Using transcribed audio recordings, a synopsis of ideas was
recorded in the form of field notes. After reviewing the data obtained from the interviews,
research contrasts and comparisons were made, looking for patterns, along with the development
of metaphors. Information was then contracted into a more concise and categorized format.
Evaluation of the information was performed utilizing systematic procedures for inductive
inquiry and working within the analytic framework from literature.
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Questions pertinent to this thesis include the inclusivity of the agency to community input
and concern, agency strategy changes, cross-community relationships, interest group strategies,
and the effectiveness of interest group strategies in the policy community. For a full list of the
questions posed to interviewees, refer to Appendix B. The interview style is comprised of openended research questions, thereby allowing me to listen intently to the interviewee and scrutinize,
study, as well as continually shape the research process. In order to conduct a thorough review
of the material to answer the questions, the synthesized data is reviewed and connections are
made between the multiple sources of information. Based upon the foundation of data, a
conclusion on Palisades’ community’s relationships, power structure, and inclusivity is drawn.
An application for permission to pursue interviews was completed in accordance with the
Human Subjects Institutional Review Board process. Exemption from full-panel review was
granted on February 14, 2013; this exemption is included as Appendix C.

Participant Observation
In addition to both historical information and one-on-one interviews, the study also
incorporates first-hand participant observation results. Participant observation is another way to
build rapport, which is a major tenet in Creswell’s method of data collection. Sources in this
category involve actors closely related to the Palisades policy community and therefore have
inherent value because of their direct connection to research questions involving community
structure. Information gathered from these sources was recorded in the form of field notes and
assimilated in the results section as a separate set of data.
Throughout the study time period, roughly November 2012 to April 2013, all attempts to
engage directly with the policy process and policy community were made. Interest group
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activity was observed by attending Michigan Safe Energy Future (MSEF) planning meetings,
and the group also added me to their online listserv. This listserv provided a wealth of
information and perspective, as the group was extremely active in sharing documents, analyses,
and strategies. MSEF was also active in hosting public events, which I attended when available.
The most recent meeting I attended was an event featuring the Union of Concerned Scientists in
April 2013. Agency and interest group activity was observed primarily at an NRC public
meeting in December 2012.
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V. Results
V.I Historical Data
Located just outside of South Haven in Covert Township, Michigan, Palisades Nuclear
Power Plant has provided electricity to communities along the southeastern shore of Lake
Michigan for over four decades. The plant officially began operations in late December of 1971
and has held a prominent role on the community stage from its inception to today. During its
forty-two years of existence, the plant has undergone over one hundred shutdowns, been
subjected to scrutiny by dozens of environmental groups under the purview of two different
regulatory agencies, and has switched ownership from one major power company to another. In
short, Palisades has had an active history. An investigation into this active history is necessary in
order to establish Palisades within the context of the community of South Haven and the nuclear
era at large.
Construction of Palisades began in March of 1967 after site approval by the former
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in Covert Township, Michigan, adjacent to Van Buren State
Park and roughly 7 miles south of the City of South Haven. According to media sources at the
time, a public hearing hosted by the AEC prior to construction did not yield any community
concern or objection to the construction of Palisades on the Lake Michigan shoreline. Within
two years, Congress enacted the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in 1970, mandating
all federal agencies to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for all projects. Since
the operation of Palisades was under the authority of the AEC, this forced the commission to “do
something it had never been required to do before- consider something other than radiological
safety before licensing a nuclear power plant” (KG, Aug. 1972). The environmental issue at
stake was the heating of Lake Michigan’s water directly next to the plant and the effect of
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increased temperatures on fish populations. Many interested groups pushed for cooling towers to
be added to the plant’s design in order to mitigate these potentially harmful environmental
effects.. Utilizing NEPA, conservationist groups successfully delayed the issuance of a “full
power” license from the AEC through hearings on the matter until late 1972, nearly two years
after Palisades was scheduled to begin service.
A little over three months into the plant’s “full power” operations, Palisades experienced
its first radioactive leak into the waters of Lake Michigan, prompting a shutdown on January
26th, 1973. Consumers Energy, the owner of Palisades during the time, claimed that a low level
of radioactivity was released and that there was “no danger” in the leak. An AEC spokesman
stated that plant officials responded properly to the leak by notifying the AEC quickly. During
this time, however, the AEC did not require utility companies to alert the public in the event of a
leak. Within a day, environmental groups berated the plant, stating that the leak was “an
indication that the system is not as safe as the [AEC] and the contractors said it was” (KG, Jan.
1973). New leaks discovered in August of 1973 prompted another shutdown after the previous
leaks had been repaired. This time, the plant stayed closed for the remainder of the year. An
article published in November of 1973 reveals that in the twenty-month existence of the plant,
Palisades had been shut down for about ten months total, roughly half of its lifetime (KG, Nov.
1973).
Throughout most of the 1970’s, Palisades’ operational history followed a similar pattern:
minor leaks, shutdowns, repairs, criticism, and a restart. On average, the plant encountered
enough problems to initiate a shutdown about 2-3 times per year. The AEC at various times
levied fees against Consumers Energy for poor management and held hearings to determine the
validity of accusations brought against the safety of the plant. By the end of the 1970’s, the
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) had replaced the AEC as a regulatory agency, but to
little avail for environment groups, which were not simply criticizing the plant anymore, but
instead calling for Palisades to be closed permanently (KG, May 1979). In November of 1979,
the NRC levied a $450,000 fine against Consumers Energy (approx. $1.5 million in 2012 dollars,
adjusted for inflation) for improper plant maintenance, the costliest fee ever assessed by the
agency at that time (KG, Nov. 1979). Performance of the plant at the close of the 1970’s did not
improve from its early years; the plant was operational 54% of the time over the past eight years
(KG, Nov. 1979).
Stemming from problems in the 1970’s, the dawn of the 1980’s represented an era of
tension between the NRC and Consumers over Palisades. Media articles from the early 1980’s
include representatives from Consumers Power assuring the safety and cost-effectiveness of
nuclear power to the public while simultaneously criticizing the NRC for causing increases in
power prices due to new preventative guidelines. For instance, an NRC mandate to equip
Palisades with protection from earthquakes drew criticism from the industry for being
unnecessary and too costly (KG, Jan. 1980). In an effort to add more transparency to regulation,
James Keppler, then-regional director of the NRC for the Midwest, assured communities that a
“public awareness program would accelerate” in 1981, thereby allowing members of the public
to witness meetings between the NRC and its licensees (KG, Dec. 1980).
Despite earning favorable marks for 1982, Palisades continued to operate under scrutiny
for the remainder of the 1980’s, but was also able to avoid harsh penalties from the NRC. A
media article from 1982 reveals that because of the plant’s prior performance, the NRC almost
held a “show cause” hearing on why Palisades should not be shut down in early 1981 (KG, Oct.
1982). Instead, Consumers Power convinced the NRC not to take such action. During the mid-
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1980’s, NRC called for closer monitoring of Palisades due to chronic issues related to steam
valves at the plant. Members of the House Subcommittee on Energy expressed “lingering
concerns” with Palisades’ operation in a memo from 1985 (KG, Aug. 1985). By early 1986,
Consumers had a stack of 2,374 outstanding work orders for repairs on the plant; the NRC
required a management strategy for these work orders to be prepared before operations could
continue (KG, May 1986). As one NRC report put it, there was “a continuing backlog of
corrective work requests which was almost unmanageable and a very weak preventative
maintenance program” (KG, Sep. 1987). The agency blatantly accused plant officials of “work
prioritization based almost exclusively on the establishment of minimum conditions to support
plant restart” and felt that management had a “pronounced tendency to try to evaluate problems
away rather than [fix] them” (KG, Sep. 1987).
Almost the entirety of the 1990’s revolved around one aspect of Palisades: nuclear waste
storage. As discussed previously, the Department of Energy (DOE) was charged with the
storage and disposal of nuclear waste at the Yucca Mountain repository by January 31st, 1998.
Quickly running out of room, Palisades, like many other plants, was eventually forced to
implement on-site “dry cask” storage in order to continue operating after the DOE informed
utilities that it would not collect waste starting in1998. By 1993, activist groups and citizens
alike began expressing their concerns with nuclear waste being stored near Lake Michigan,
presumably for at least a decade. Former State of Michigan Attorney General Frank Kelley
petitioned the NRC to hold public hearings before the storage of nuclear waste began. Although
no hearing was ever held, the NRC sought public comment in February of 1993 (KG, Feb. 1993).
The NRC granted an on-site nuclear storage license to Consumers Power on April 2nd,
1993, which sparked a firestorm of criticism and inquiry into the NRC’s safety guidelines and
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legitimacy. Through an agency decision, the NRC added “dry storage casks” to the list of
acceptable temporary storage facilities, thus clearing the way for Palisades’ ability to store waste
on-site. “Thousands of residents statewide” decried the decision, calling attention to the
proximity of the aforementioned casks to Lake Michigan. One resident shared at an NRC public
meeting, “You [NRC] come up with these charts to try to cover up and make people feel safe –
and it’s not working” (KG, May 1994). Clearly, at this time, the public was feeling excluded
from the policymaking process; not only was the public not permitted to have a hearing on the
appropriateness of on-site storage, but the NRC seemed to have already made up its mind on
how storage was going to be managed.
After the turn of the century, local and national focus shifted to the completion of the
Yucca Mountain repository in Nevada. County commissioners and state representatives alike
were passing resolutions asking House and Senate members to make sure plans at Yucca would
go through; with nuclear waste piling up at Palisades, these issues were of particular concern for
many local elected officials (KG, Mar. 2002). Beginning in 2005, a push from environmentalists
for the closure of Palisades made headlines ahead of the plant’s scheduled 2007 hearings for
relicensing. An article from 2006 reveals that most environmental groups were not optimistic
about successfully stopping a relicensing based upon the NRC’s history. The license was
renewed in March of 2007, allowing Palisades to operate until March of 2031.
Today, the 777-megawatt plant still provides power to Michigan southwest communities,
but also provides a source of anxiety for environmentalists and anti-nuclear groups alike.
Questions of small leaks from the on-site cask storage have recently arisen and, with no
permanent nuclear waste storage solution in sight after 2010, the problem seems direr than ever.
Of greatest concern to many is the age of Palisades. By the time the plant’s current license
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expires, the facility will have been in service for sixty years, forty years longer than its original
foreseen lifespan as evaluated by the AEC in the 1960’s. In addition to age, the plant’s
documented structural deficiencies highlighted in the 1970’s lend themselves well to activists’
calls to “shut down” Palisades before it “melts down.” Overall, the plant is still receiving a great
amount of publicity as it continues to operate on the shores of Lake Michigan.
Throughout its four decades of existence, Palisades has remained in the public spotlight
during various eras of nuclear policy and concern. From early design flaws to modern aging
concerns, the plant and its relationship with both the community and its regulator have been
tested and sometimes damaged. Looking forward, there are no plans to decommission the plant
in the immediate future; on the contrary, its current license will keep Palisades operating for
another 18 years, at which point another renewal may be possible. The problems facing
Palisades and other reactors are many, but the NRC continues to stand by its policies as effective
guidelines to operate these plants safely now and in the future.

V.II: Interview Responses & Student Investigator Observations
The Agency
Interviews with an agency respondent began by asking about the perceived receptivity of
the organization in relation to “community input and concern.” Receptivity level helps illustrate
the inclusivity of the policy community, which is major defining factor of communities. On the
topic of NRC receptivity to community input and concern, agency respondent felt that the NRC
is “highly receptive to hearing what the public has to say,” citing the multitude of scheduled
meetings between the agency, Palisades, and the public. When further asked about receptivity,
translating community input into agency strategy changes, respondent detailed the procedure by
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which the agency seeks more “engagement” with the licensee. According to the administrator,
“trigger points” are reached based on performance and risk assessments, the results of which
dictate whether or not the NRC will take further action with any licensee. During the interview,
respondent made it clear that these assessments are “solely” responsible for triggering greater
action with a licensee; “public concern” alone was not grounds for greater engagement with
Palisades.
However, public relief does exist in the form of a petition for the NRC to take action.
This petition is called a 2.206 and can be filed by any citizen or organization. NRC staff
evaluate these petitions for standing and other criteria. The process, although used “fairly often,”
does not typically yield relief sought by the petitioner. “[The petitioner] will get an answer- a
thorough answer,” the administrator explained, however, “it’s likely that [the petitioner is] not
going to get the relief [that he or she wants].” In response to criticism from public interest
groups decrying the process as “useless,” the agency responds that they are constantly
monitoring the site, ensuring that licensees are complying with their respective licenses. Overall,
the reasoning for infrequent relief through a 2.206 petition stems from the fact that the agency
feels “it would be very rare for us to miss something […] that a member of the public could
identify.”
Respondent was then questioned about NRC response to plants with increased public
attention. This question presents a scenario in which more actors in a policy community become
involved, and the flexibility or rigidity of the NRC’s response speaks to the agency’s level of
ability to engage cooperatively with other members in the community. When thinking about
plants with greater public interest, respondent mentioned that the NRC’s strategies change in
regards to being “open and transparent.” The administrator cited a couple of examples on how
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staff could “go beyond the minimum” when public interest is higher for a specific plant or issue,
including open public meetings and publishing a public summary of phone conversations with
licensees all in an effort to give the public as much information as possible. Respondent feels
that “openness and transparency gives the public interest groups their say,” because giving them
information allows them to use that information to file petitions, contact Congress people, or go
to the press. In general, transparency and openness to information is a primary tool for the NRC
to relate with the public. As the administrator concluded this section of the interview, “When
there’s public interest, I tend to bend over backwards in our value of transparency and
openness.”
In addition to community input and concern, the agency was also questioned on
relationships between itself and other members of the policy community, including Congress and
the agency’s licensees. This question is important to consider because relationships comprise the
structure of the community, and an understanding of the structure of the community is critical
when evaluating whether or not Palisades’ community resembles an iron triangle. With regards
to Congressional relationships, respondent stated that the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 gives the
NRC “complete authority” to regulate plants. All rules generated for use by the Commission are
created internally, not legislated by Congress. In this way, the 1954 Act delegates all power and
decisionmaking authority to the NRC, leaving no substantive work for Congress. When asked to
describe the relationship between the NRC and its licensees, respondent commented that the
relationship is “appropriately professional.” The administrator also added that transparency and
openness are core values to show the public “how much separation there is between the licensees
and the Commission.” For example, “our inspectors don’t have lunch with the licensees,” and,
“we ask them not them not to interact socially with the licensees.” Respondent claims that this
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separation highlights the value of objectivity held by the NRC. Finally, respondent mentioned
that a mutual level of respect exists between the agency and licensees, “even though many times,
[the licensee doesn’t] agree with us.”
Keeping on the topic of community relationships, but also in an attempt to get at the
previous questions of community input and concern, the next series of questions were designed
to evaluate interest group impact on the relationship between the NRC and licensees, such as
Palisades. A measurement of impact can assist in understanding the rigidity of relationships in
the community. Relationship resilience is yet another delineating aspect that gets at the overall
community structure. The question was posed, “Do you feel that anti-nuclear activist groups or
any activist groups have any influence on the relationship or impact on what [the relationship] is
today?” Respondent answered directly, “I don’t think it changes the relationship between the
NRC and its licensee because we live by our values and our processes and procedures.” The
NRC administrator said that this answer holds true “regardless of what the public does.”
Furthermore, when responding to questions about the centrality of activist group opinions in
shaping NRC decisions, the administrator restated that the Commission “listens appropriately to
public interest groups,” but at the end of the process, “the Commission has to make their own
mind.” Citing reasons such as differentiated community concern based on the problem at hand,
including particularly high concern for specific plants, but no public interest in others,
respondent feels that “you can’t regulate by public interest.”

Elected Officials
Apart from the agency, the next sector of the Palisades policy community to be explored
is the government, most specifically elected officials. As before, a prompt regarding the NRC’s

34

receptivity to community input helps to illuminate the inclusivity of the policy community.
When asked about the NRC’s receptivity to community input and concern, a government
representative echoed many similar characteristics mentioned by the NRC administrator,
including “constant visibility” and “always holding meetings.” Overall, respondent feels that
these attributes convey a good degree of receptivity. As further evidence of receptivity, the
representative feels that because Palisades is on the “watch list” of some public interest groups,
the plant shuts down more often. However, despite hearing some concern about the plant’s
operation, respondent comments that these concerns are “not often.” In fact, the majority of
constituency requests regarding nuclear power are for additional nuclear power plants to be
constructed.
Although nuclear regulation is a federal power and therefore outside the purview of the
respondent’s jurisdiction, questions regarding the relationship between the NRC, respondent’s
office, and the public were asked in order to help situate each sector within in the policy
community. In reference to the respondent’s relationship with the NRC, the only substantial
interaction comes from the NRC’s disclosure of information to the representative. Because the
plant is located within the representative’s geographical jurisdiction, the agency provides
respondent with updates on shutdowns and general operational status as necessary. On the issue
of relating to the public, respondent was asked to quantify the importance of activist group
impact on policy decisions. In that capacity, the representative is “always listening,” but feels
tasked with the responsibility of “separating fact from fiction.” In addition, the representative
mentioned that constituents expressing concern are usually directed to his or her respective
federal representative. However, it is this respondent’s experience that the majority of concerns
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with Palisades are from out-of-constituency regions, whereas respondent’s constituents “put
great stock in the safety and efficacy of nuclear power.”

Interest Groups
The final sector interviewed in the Palisades policy community is public interest groups,
namely anti-nuclear activist groups. All three respondents in this category varied in duration of
membership in such groups as well as roles in the groups. When asked to quantify NRC
receptivity to community input and concern, two of the respondents directly answered that there
is no receptivity present “at all.” A third respondent on the same prompt offered a viewpoint that
the NRC is “more swayed towards supporting the nuclear power industry than […] protecting the
environment.” With the primary objective of all three respondents’ interest groups being
improved performance and eventual shutdown of Palisades, the activists based their
receptiveness of the NRC on observable changes in NRC strategies related to the plant. As one
respondent remarked, “[It] is frustrating to think that these [anti-nuclear groups] could work on
these issue for 20 years and still have the plants operating.” Another respondent, commenting on
the NRC public hearings, called the meetings a “dog and pony show,” feeling that, “[the NRC is]
not hearing our concerns and addressing our concerns, and they just keep telling us […] that
[they] would never let anything happen that would cause a problem for the community. I don’t
believe that.” Respondent goes on to mention examples of NRC’s failure to fix problems in
Palisades’ operations, including unknown month-long system failures. Once again, agency
receptivity is mainly based on the NRC’s translation of community concern into strategy changes
or improved plant performance; receptivity as such has not been witnessed consistently by any of
the respondents.
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A series of questions relating to interest group strategies helps to illustrate active plans
for attaining the goals of these interest groups; the questions also asked members to evaluate the
effectiveness of their own strategies. An assessment of interest group strategies addresses the
questions of “how” and “why” activist groups target specific actors both inside and outside the
policy community. Generally speaking, all respondents mentioned strategies aimed at increasing
awareness of the current Palisades situation in an effort to amass supporters in order to more
effectively press change in NRC regulation. “Education and communication” are among some
of the primary strategies for effecting change; from the viewpoint of respondents, greater access
to information will lead to social unrest, sparking greater demand for a change in the regulation
of Palisades. One respondent mentioned an idea to advertise about Palisades on a billboard
located near communities potentially affected by a Palisades accident. Another respondent
spoke generally on the concept of reaching out to an increasing number of groups in order to put
“more pressure on area politicians and decision makers.” An organized visit to a United States
Senator’s local office was also pursued as another activist strategy to seek change in Palisades’
and the NRC’s operations. In the majority of cases, the overall theme is that “publicity […] is
what’s going to be effective.” As respondents see it, a strong coalition of citizens must be
formed in order to place the proper amount of “pressure” on Senators and Congress people. In
addition to working through “existing channels” like Congress, the NRC, and the court system, a
third respondent felt that advocating for alternative energy sources should be a primary tool in
effecting change. As opposed to the other respondents, this activist felt that economics, rather
than policy change, would play a major role in getting Palisades closed. On the topic of
economics, respondent stated, “one of the strongest reasons that we wanted nuclear energy was
because we thought it was going to be less expensive.” Now that alternative energy sources are
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increasingly affordable, the political and economic feasibility of them will eventually lead to the
transition away from nuclear power.
In addition to interest group strategies of education and communication with outside
members of the community, investigator observation revealed that activist groups are also
engaged in constant internal communication through e-mail and meetings. Through these forms
of communication, activists created a forum for discussion of Palisades updates, news reports
concerning nuclear safety, upcoming NRC-hosted meetings, visiting activist groups and experts,
and ideas for new strategies. Activists from many different groups and locations commented and
were actively engaged with communication. In-person meetings provided group members with
the opportunity to revise and reorganize strategies, coordinate efforts, and present group
members with personal ideas and suggestions.
The difference in respondents’ strategies can be attributed to each individual activist’s
belief in the importance of interest groups directly shaping policy decisions. When given the
opportunity to respond to a scaled quantitative question regarding the importance of interest
group impact, two of the respondents, on a scale of 1-10 with 10 being “extremely important,”
rated the importance as “9” and “10.” Respondents with these high values attributed their
answers to a belief that “activism is to hold the entities responsible for doing their jobs,” as well
as the belief that there isn’t “any other way that we can affect any change in the nuclear system
[other than direct activist impact].” A third respondent rated the importance of direct activist
impact as “2.” This respondent explains, “I don’t really have a lot of faith […] that policy will
drive change. I believe that the economics drive change.”
In addition to detailing the strategies employed by activist groups, the interview also
focused on a self-assessment of those strategies in relation to the success of achieving goals set
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by the organizations as a means of further evaluating interest group significance in the policy
community. Responses were generally negative. One respondent plainly stated, “I don’t think
we’ve been effective.” Once again, the measuring stick for success is a change in regulatory
strategies, to which respondents feel “[the NRC is] continuing onward with the same unsafe
practices […].” The only headway respondents feel they have made is creating an increased
level of attention on the NRC and Palisades. One activist commented about a recent NRC public
meeting, “If there are enough people anxious about it, [the NRC] will do something. What they
did […] was they gave an enormous emphasis on safety factors by the staff at Palisades.” As far
as the effectiveness of their current strategies, a respondent stated, “I think that we definitely
have made it known that we’re watching [the NRC] very closely and so perhaps in that regard
they’re trying to anticipate problems and address them publicly before there’s more of a
problem.” Although respondents feel that regulatory strategies have not been altered, there is
some semblance of impact recognized by the activists in relation to NRC public meetings.
Attempting to gain a picture of the policy community from the activist groups’
perspective, the next series of questions focused on the perceived inclusivity of the policy
community as well as the groups’ placement within that community. These topics speak directly
to the thesis question of policy community structure as well as provide a source for comparative
analysis with other members of the community. Another scaled quantitative question was posed
to respondents, asking them to rank the inclusivity of the policy community on a scale from 1-10,
with 10 being “extremely inclusive.” Between all three respondents, the highest rating was a
“3,” with the other respondents’ ratings listed as “1” and “2.”

Two of the respondents

mentioned a certain degree of inclusivity, based on the existence of NRC-hosted public
meetings, attendance at the events, and “some reporting” in the newspapers. However, on the
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topic of NRC meetings, an activist berated the legitimate inclusiveness of the meetings, stating,
“we’re listened to and we’re fed some kind of cockamamie answer that doesn’t answer the
questions, but is supposed to appease the public. [NRC officials] never come back and say,
‘okay, we heard your concern and this is how we’re addressing them.” For this respondent,
evidence of policy community inclusivity is based on changes to Palisades’ regulatory strategies.
Another activist echoed similar sentiments about a local city council meeting. “All [the
councilmen] did was listen. Not exactly with ‘glazed over’ eyes, but they didn’t ask any
questions at all. And they went on [with] the next item, as if it didn’t exist.” Even at the federal
level, respondents comment on the lack of consideration given to activists and public interest
groups concerned with Palisades. One activist refers to a Congressman who is “consistently”
more concerned with getting Palisades up and running than with public safety after a shutdown.
Yet another source of policy community exclusivity sensed by respondents is the centralized
power of nuclear operators, referred to as the “established industry.” Due to economic reasons, a
respondent contends, “[the industry is] not very interested in transition.”
Continuing with questions regarding policy community characteristics, respondents were
also asked to place interest groups in the context of the entire Palisades community. Thinking
conceptually about their placement, one respondent posited, “probably at the bottom [of the
community],” and further illustrated, “we would definitely be a slice of pie, but not a very large
slice.” These conclusions are based, in part, on the lack of observable response to activist group
strategies and concerns from other members in the Palisades community. Another respondent
comments that interest groups similar to anti-nuclear groups are “peripheral” to both the local
community and the NRC. Compared to what respondent labels the “existing power structure,”
activist groups have little chance of making much of an impact, especially at the local level
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where jobs and county tax revenue would take a hit if Palisades were to shut down. Speaking on
the future position of activists in the policy community, a respondent comments that such interest
groups “will continue to be [periphery] unless there is some dramatic change in the way […]
people think about things.”
Supplementing questions about the perceived structure of the policy community, interest
group members were also interviewed on the relationship between NRC and Palisades, as well as
confidence in the NRC’s overall abilities to regulate Palisades. This question provides a direct
cross-examination of the agency’s relationships utilizing an identical question posed to the
agency itself, which serves the purposes of 1) adding depth to the understanding of the NRCPalisades relationship and 2) illustrating the level of continuity in perceptions of the NRCPalisades relationship from a different sector of the community. Continuity speaks to the degree
of consensus within the community, which is a defining feature in determining what community
model fits Palisades best. Responses relating to the NRC’s ability to regulate were generally
negative. One respondent directly stated, “I don’t have any confidence.” One reason for a lack
of NRC confidence offered by respondents is that the agency’s own existence would be
threatened if it chose to shut down plants. Respondent explains, “it’s hard for […] an
organization to make changes that would eliminate [its] own job.” On regulatory abilities,
another activist acknowledged, “I think that [the NRC has] the rules in place,” but continued on
to criticize the effectiveness of application to an industry “that’s dragging its feet.” One
respondent’s efficacy in the NRC’s regulation abilities is directly related to perceptions of the
NRC-Palisades relationship. As the activist explains, “I think [NRC staff] are in place too long
and so therefore they develop personal relationships with people they’re working with at the
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plant, and I think that interferes with [the NRC’s] ability to take definitive action and administer
sanctions.”

Participant Observation
Activist meetings, such as those put on by visiting experts in the nuclear policy
community, deepened the understanding of relationships within the Palisades policy community.
For example, during an investigator-attended meeting, an expert from a widely respected interest
group commented on the policy community structure surrounding nuclear power plants across
the country, including Palisades. According to the expert, the NRC’s regulatory agenda and
success has much to do with Congressional desires. On numerous occasions, attempts by the
NRC to enforce stricter regulations on plants have been met with Congressional threats to
withdraw or limit funding to the agency. This, according to the expert, leads to the conclusion
that the NRC is simply an agency controlled by Congress. The agency is capable of creating
sound technical rules and requirements, but lacks the necessary political insulation to properly
pursue their task of ensuring public safety.
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VI. Discussion
After compiling results from the Palisades case study, an application of the literature on
iron triangle and issue network frameworks will be applied to the data in order to answer the
research question at hand, namely: how well does the iron triangle framework explain the
nuclear policy community relationships and outcomes. Data from the previous section will also
be used to evaluate the second research question involving how interest group behavior
influences nuclear policy communities. The Palisades policy community as understood through
research will be evaluated on the three community characteristics of actor composition,
inclusivity, and rigidity, as detailed in both iron triangles and issue networks. From this
discussion, a conclusion of the accuracy of the iron triangle framework to describe Palisades’
policy community will be reached. After an evaluation of the policy community, a discussion of
interest group strategies will follow.
The first criterion upon which the Palisades policy community will be evaluated is actor
composition. During the late 1960’s, Palisades’ main policy community was comprised of the
former Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and Consumers Energy. It was during this era of
nuclear regulation that the regulatory agency was also the industry promoter, as directed by the
former Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE). During the licensing of Palisades, no third
parties raised any concerns about the construction of the plant. The only actors involved at this
time were the agency, the agency’s clientele (Consumers), and the JCAE. Based on the small
number and types of actors involved during Palisades’ licensing, the community’s actor
composition most closely resembled an iron triangle. However, only two years after Palisades
received its license and began construction, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) was
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passed, providing an avenue for groups contending AEC decisions on environmental grounds to
join the policy community.
Beginning in the early 1970’s, conservationist groups demanded hearings on the plant’s
design in an effort to force Consumers to add cooling towers to Palisades to counteract negative
environmental effects. The inclusion of such groups in the formal policymaking process
provides evidence that Palisades’ prior iron triangle policy community was breaking down, as
standard iron triangles do not allow for any more actors than an agency, a client, and a
Congressional committee. In fact, the passage of NEPA alone was indicative of a broadening set
of actors; powerful committees were not controlling overall Congressional activity during this
era. As the 1970’s progressed, however, the number of actors in the policy community seemed
to shrink back towards a model more consistent with an iron triangle. Throughout this decade,
the plant’s poor performance was met with harsh criticism from environmentalists, but as
opposed to the groups’ prior success in asserting power during the cooling tower debate,
Palisades continued to operate without hindrance on behalf of the environmentalists. Although
fines and sanctions were imposed on Palisades by the AEC, the Commission appeared to be the
only arbiter to whom Palisades was required to answer, thus signaling a narrowing of the policy
community.
In relation to actor composition of the Palisades policy community, the 1980’s witnessed
a continued trend of iron triangle-like regulation from its new agency, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC). Beginning operations in 1975, the NRC’s sole responsibility as regulator
(no longer a promoter, as well) placed the agency in a unique position to reprimand Palisades for
its overall poor performance. During the early 1980’s, however, the NRC was convinced by
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Consumers Energy to hold off on hearings that could lead to Palisades’ shutdown. This kind of
agency-clientele negotiation is similar to what one would expect from iron triangle actors.
Even from the 1990’s onward, Palisades’ policy community still contained a small,
limited number of actors when formulating policy. For example, one of the biggest issues of the
1990’s for Palisades was nuclear waste disposal. Despite public outcry of “on-site” spent
nuclear fuel (SNF) storage, casks were added to the list of NRC-approved temporary storage
facilities through an agency decision in 1993; no public hearing was ever held. This decision
allowed the plants to continue operating, but seemingly ignored the voices of interest groups
against the measure. Once again, a small subset of actors seemed to be in charge of making
decisions in this policy domain, a characteristic consistent with iron triangle communities. As
recent as 2007, the NRC engaged in yet another independent decision involving Palisades, this
time extending the operating license of the plant to 2031. Anti-nuclear activist groups and some
citizens were opposed to the measure, but the renewal was approved anyway.
In addition to actor composition, the Palisades policy community can also be evaluated
on its overall inclusivity of internal and external actors. Inclusivity is a measure of the
community’s receptivity and accessibility to actors both inside and outside of the network.
Communities resembling an iron triangle would be prone to exclusive traits, whereas the issue
network framework emphasizes a great deal of inclusivity. In 1980, James Keppler, thenregional director for the NRC’s Midwest, stated that an increasing amount of public “awareness”
programs would be implemented over the coming years, allowing for greater transparency of the
agency. Today, responses on the policy community’s inclusivity are mixed across sectors of the
community.
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Both the agency and government respondents in this study felt that the NRC is “highly
receptive” to community input and concern based on the frequency of public meetings held
between the NRC, licensees, and the public. An agency respondent characterized the NRC’s
efforts at transparency as one of the agency’s greatest tools in public relations. The concept
behind transparency is to give other actors in the community the opportunity to gather
information from agency processes and then use that information in beneficial ways. However,
public interest group responses clashed directly with these assessments of NRC inclusivity and
overall community inclusivity. For activist respondents, inclusivity is measured by the
translation of community concern into strategy changes or improved plant performance. In this
respect, respondents feel excluded and unsuccessful in their attempts to shape policy. When
asked to rank the community’s inclusivity on a scale of 1-10 with 10 being “extremely
inclusive,” the mean response from activists was “2.” One respondent comments that “[the NRC
is] continuing onward with the same unsafe practices,” despite public comment decrying agency
direction. To that end, relief in the form of a “2.206” petition can be filed against the NRC by
activists or citizens; this petition requests that the Commission take specific action on a plant or
issue. Despite being offered as an avenue for public interest group inclusivity, an agency
respondent reveals, “it’s likely that [the petitioner is] not going to get the relief [that he or she
wants].” The reasoning for infrequent relief through a 2.206 petition stems from the fact that the
agency feels “it would be very rare for us to miss something […] that a member of the public
could identify.” A skeptical mindset such as this one serves to re-emphasize a certain amount of
exclusivity displayed by the community when concerns of safety issues arise.
Besides interaction with the NRC, interest group members also cite evidence of
exclusivity in other sectors of Palisades’ policy community. From local city councils to
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Congressional representatives, activists cite an overwhelming desire on behalf of the
governmental sector to keep Palisades operational. To some extent, respondents contend, their
concerns fall on deaf ears, “as if [they] didn’t exist.”
The final dimension by which the Palisades community will be measured is its rigidity.
Rigidity gets at the flexibility of the organization over time, and can serve as a complementary
indicator to inclusivity, revealing how a community reacts to new ideas or differing viewpoints.
As rigidity increases, the potential for impact from one sector of the community decreases.
During the case study, an agency respondent was asked to evaluate the impact of interest group
activity on the NRC’s relationship with its licensees. Respondent claims that the relationship
had not been affected by the public interest sector, nor would it be affected “regardless of what
the public does.” In this instance, it’s clear that the relationship between agency and licensee is
very rigid, even under pressure from another sector of the policy community. As opposed to
regulating by public interest, the agency chooses to abide by its own policies and procedures.
Despite the claim of unchanging strategies under pressure, agency respondent did cite an
increased sensitivity to the need for transparency in plants with heightened public interest,
mentioning efforts to “bend over backwards” in regards to transparency and openness.
As was mentioned in the previous section, interest group respondents based their
evaluation of inclusivity on strategy changes pursued by the NRC. In many respects, these
respondents based their evaluation of rigidity on similar criteria. Unchanging strategies provide
further evidence of their ineffective impact, compounded by the low level of inclusivity felt of
the community. However, multiple activist respondents commented on interest group ability to
“make it known that we’re watching” the agency very closely, which might have the effect of
encouraging the NRC to anticipate problems before they happen. One respondent noticed a
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distinct emphasis on a particular safety concern during one NRC public meeting that had been
criticized by interest groups prior to the meeting. So, in some respects, it does seem that a
certain amount of flexibility is being felt within the community as a response to public concern.
The perceived shift in public meeting strategies from both “sides” of the community provides a
clear example of some kind of impact made by public interest groups.
As it relates to activist group priorities, directly shaping policy decisions is extremely
high. On a scale of 1-10, with 10 being “direct policy impact is extremely important,” the mean
response was “7.” Among reasons for these responses was the belief that nothing can be done
about the nuclear system except through direct policy impact. Based on these responses, activist
responses praising the need for greater support make sense. As part of a strategic plan to impact
policy, activist respondents listed “education and communication” as primary methods for
attaining that goal. The more information available to the public about Palisades, the more likely
public support could be amassed and used to change the direction of said policy. Respondents
point to Congress’s mandate to dutifully represent constituency desires and feel that the public
just needs more information in order to make this happen.
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VII. Conclusion
Based on the evaluation of policy community frameworks applied to Palisades, it is
apparent that neither the iron triangle nor the issue network provides an adequate depiction of
this policy community. After applying the three characteristics of actor composition, inclusivity,
and rigidity to Palisades, the best-fitting framework for this case study should be described as a
“glass triangle.” This framework serves as a hybridization between the classic iron triangle and
issue networks, combining elements of each to create a unique policy community.
While it is true that the “iron” aspect of the triangle no longer exists due to increased
transparency, based on this case study, decisionmaking is still bound up between a smaller
network of individuals, including the agency, Congress, and the nuclear industry. In this respect,
issue networks do not provide an accurate understanding of the policy community, as a
traditional issue network is much more open, fluid, and inclusive. Interest groups have the
ability to witness and see interactions between the agency and licensees, but their power is still
limited by a vestigial structure predisposed to exclusivity. As has been revealed through
discussion, the success of interest groups in affecting policy remains miniscule, but can be
thought of as a “crack” in the glass of this weakened triangle. The fact that both the NRC and
anti-nuclear activist groups recognize increasing attention to nuclear power and the need to be
more transparent might suggest that the policy community structure is weakening and moving
towards an issue network framework.
The limitations of this study are primarily centered on a lack of representation from all
members of the policy community. While a number of activist respondents were included in the
study, both agency and government representative categories were lacking and, therefore, may
not describe the Palisades policy community as accurately as possible.
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Based on the conclusions of this study, a greater understanding of the capabilities and
limitations of each sector in the policy community may be gleaned, providing a source for
informed strategic planning for members of the community in designing future policy.
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VIII. Appendices
Appendix A: Policy Community Interview Pool

Subject Name

Title

Fred Upton

U.S. House
Representative

Carl Levin

U.S. Senator

Debbie
Stabenow

Research
Category
Elected
Official:
Federal
Government

Representation

Phone

E-mail

MI District 6,
House
Committee on
Energy and
Commerce

(202) 2253761

Web Form

Elected
Official:
Federal
Government

State of
Michigan

(202) 2246221

Web Form

U.S. Senator

Elected
Official:
Federal
Government

State of
Michigan

(202) 2244822

Web Form

John Proos

Michigan State
Senator

Elected
Official: State
Government

MI State Senate
District 21

(517) 3736960

SenJProos@
senate.michigan.gov

Aric Nesbitt

Michigan State
House
Representative

Elected
Official: State
Government

MI State House
District 66

(517) 3730893

AricNesbitt@
house.mi.gov

Robert Burr

Mayor

Local
Government

City of South
Haven,
Michigan

(269) 6376276

rburr@southhaven.com

John Mike
Henry

County
Commissioner

Local
Government

Van Buren
County,
Michigan
District 1

(269) 2146496

---

Charles Casto

Regional
Administrator,
Region III

Federal Agency

NRC

---

chuck.casto@nrc.gov

Thomas Taylor

Senior Resident
Inspector

Federal Agency

NRC

(630) 8299662

---

April Scarbeary

Resident
Inspector

Federal Agency

NRC

(630) 8299662

---

Tony Vitale

Site Vice
President
Communications
Manager

Interest Group:
Corporation
Interest Group:
Corporation

EntergyPalisades
EntergyPalisades

(630) 8299662
(269) 7642333

---

Mark Savage

51

msavage@
entergy.com

Kevin Kamps

Radioactive
Waste Watchdog

Interest Group:
Anti-Nuclear

Beyond Nuclear

(301) 2702209 ext. 1

kevin@
beyondnuclear.org

Maynard
Kaufman /
Barbara Giesler

Michigan Land
Trustee

Interest Group:
Land Use

Michigan Land
Trustees

(269) 6501758

maynardkaufman@
wmich.edu

Alice Hirt

Board Member

Interest Group:
Anti-Nuclear

Don’t Waste
Michigan

---

alicehirt@charter.net

Gail Snyder

Member

Interest Group:
Anti-Nuclear

(630) 3636417

gail.snyder
@comcast.net

Bette Pierman

Member

Interest Group:
Anti-Nuclear

(269) 9259695

bette49022
@yahoo.com

Kraig Schultz

Owner

Interest Group:
Anti-Nuclear

Southwest
Shoreline
Renewable
Energy
Southwest
Shoreline
Renewable
Energy
Schultz
Engineering

(616) 2960362

kraig@
schultzengineering.us

Tom
McCullough

President

Interest Group:
Citizens

Palisades Park
Neighborhood
Association

(269) 7641363

---
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Appendix B: Interview Questions
Part I: Involvement/Process (Agency/Licensee)
1. How long have you been involved with the NRC and what is your role in the
organization?
2. What is/are the goal(s) of the NRC?
3. How receptive do you feel the NRC is in regards to community input and concern?
4. In what ways does the NRC adjust its strategies in order to meet the concerns of citizens?
5. What factors does the NRC take into consideration when evaluating whether or not
heightened safety protocols should be enforced at the Plant?
6. How would you describe the relationship between the NRC and its licensees?
7. Do you feel that anti-nuclear activist groups have impacted the relationship between the
NRC and its licensees, and if so, in what ways?
8. How central are the opinions of outside interest groups and citizens in shaping your
decisions?
9. How often does the NRC hold meetings with licensees? How often does the NRC hold
meetings of this caliber with citizens and activist groups?
10. How many plants has the NRC shut down for extended periods since the agency’s
inception? How many plants has the NRC decommissioned?
Part II: Perspective & Strategies (Interest Groups)
1. If you are involved in an organization, how long have you been involved with that
organization, and what is your role in the group?
2. What is/are the goal(s) of your organization?
3. How receptive do you feel the NRC is in regards to community input and concern?
4. In what ways does your group seek to influence Palisades’ policy community?
5. How successful do you feel your organization is in effecting a change in regulatory
strategies?
6. How much confidence do you have in the NRC to effectively and safely regulate
Palisades or nuclear plants in general?
7. What does your organization ultimately hope to accomplish as a direct result of activist
strategies?
8. On a scale of 1-10, how inclusive do you feel the current policy community is?
9. On a scale of 1-10, how important is it to you that activist groups make a direct impact on
policy decisions?
10. Where does your organization see itself in the context of Palisades’ policy community?

Part III: Government
1. How long have you served as an elected official in your current office?
2. Does your office take a stance on the viability or appropriateness of nuclear power? If
so, elaborate on that position.
3. How often does your office handle constituent concerns regarding Palisades Nuclear
Power Plant or nuclear power in general?
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4. How involved are you/have you been with the creation or enforcement of legislation in
the nuclear policy domain?
5. Where do you see your position in the context of Palisades’ policy community?
6. Based upon your experiences and the experiences of your constituents, how receptive do
you feel the NRC is in regards to community input and concern?
7. How would you describe your relationship with the NRC and its licensees?
8. If you encounter competing interests within your jurisdiction over the appropriateness of
nuclear power, how does your office reconcile these interests?
9. When deciding on how agencies’ policies should be revised, what considerations are
afforded the most weight in the decisionmaking process?
10. On a scale of 1-10, how important is it to you that activist groups make a direct impact on
policy decisions?

Part III: Nuclear Waste (All)
1. How feasible do you find the guidelines for nuclear waste disposal, as set down by the
Blue Ribbon Commission in 2010?
2. How important is the consent and agreement of a potential host community?
3. What do you feel is our best option for disposing of nuclear waste?
4. On a scale of 1-10, rate the effectiveness of the nation’s current nuclear waste disposal
scheme.
5. On a scale of 1-10, rate the safety of the nation’s current nuclear waste disposal scheme.
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Appendix C: HSIRB Exemption/Approval
(See attached HSIRB document).
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